Lessons in Command and Control from the Los Angeles Riots

Police officers responded to a domestic dispute, accompanied by marines.They had just gone up to the door when two shotgun birdshot rounds were fired through the door, hitting the officers.One yelled `cover me!' to the marines, who then laid down a heavy base of fire. . . .The police officer had not meant `shoot' when he yelled `cover me' to the marines.[He] meant . . .point your weapons and be prepared to respond if necessary.However, the marines responded instantly in the precise way they had been trained, where `cover me' means provide me with cover using firepower. . . .over two hundred bullets [were] fired into that house."[1] Operations other than war (OOTW) present numerous challenges to leaders instilled with a doctrine principally designed for fighting Soviet-style armies during large-scale conventional wars.[2] Some of these missions (e.g., peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and nation assistance) pose doctrinal problems due to what has been described as "the American proclivity for satisfying political decisions by using conventional military forces to produce effects that are foreign to their nature."[3] In other instances, the term OOTW presents a doctrinal challenge because the domestic activities that were once among the Army's prominent missions, such as quelling riots or performing disaster relief, had been receiving short shrift in deference to warfighting.The notion that killing people and breaking things should be the US Army's sole concern is a relatively recent development; one need only note the role of the Army in putting down Shay's rebellion in 1786-87 as well as its many other noncombat operations in the 19th and 20th centuries.Since it is unlikely that US policymakers will soon stop asking the military to perform tasks for which it is not presently designed, an understanding of the differences between war and operations other than war may help leaders primarily trained for high-intensity combat to adapt to the particular demands of other military operations.This article examines two attributes of operations other than war that are likely to influence command and control and thus affect directly the outcome of the mission: the absence of an obvious continuum or linear relationship between the strategic, operational, and tactical consequences of action, and the requirement for interagency coordination even at relatively low echelons.The article uses the 1992 Los Angeles riots to illustrate some of the unique characteristics of this type of mission: the situation was "amorphous and ambiguous," the use of force was greatly restrained, coordination with nonmilitary entities was often required at battalion and lower echelons, and political considerations governed military actions at even the individual level.[4] DoctrineThe Army's operational doctrine is contained in FM 100-5, Operations, published in 1993; it is presently under revision as the Army continues to adapt to the conditions and requirements of our time.Chapter 13 of the manual, "Operations Other Than War," identifies the activities included in such operations.One of the activities--support to domestic authorities--is clearly limited in scope; the other, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, addresses the Army's responsibilities to support both domestic and international emergencies.A companion doctrinal publication, Domestic Support Operations, also appeared in 1993.It provides considerable information to commanders and staffs for carrying out tasks associated with the four recognized forms of domestic support: disaster assistance, environmental assistance, community assistance, and support to law enforcement.The material is based on the applicable federal statutes; matters addressed in the publication include the roles and responsibilities of the branches of government and specific federal agencies, interagency coordination, principles for conducting the operations, and legal considerations and constraints.By the time these two documents appeared, the Army had just completed two operations in support of domestic authorities: support of law enforcement in the Los Angeles riots and disaster assistance to the victims of Hurricane Andrew.The former, the subject of this article, occurred in late April and early May 1992.The latter involved the 10th Mountain Division and other units of the active and reserve components for several months starting in August of the same year.Some of the lessons learned from those missions undoubtedly made their way into the emerging doctrine.Some, however, may not have been considered.It is these lessons that this article develops in detail.[5] The Los Angeles Riots in BriefThe Los Angeles (LA) riots were the most destructive civil disturbance in US history, causing the deaths of at least 54 people and more than $800 million in property damage throughout LA County.[6]More than 10,000 troops from the California National Guard (CANG), 2000 active component soldiers, and 1500 Marines were deployed to the area at the height of operations.The LA riots provide an important case study to illustrate some of the unique characteristics of domestic operations other than war.The military response to the LA riots is also noteworthy because active component and National Guard troops served together in a single joint command.Furthermore, CANG troops served first in a state status (under the command of the governor), were subsequently federalized (placed under the active component chain of command), and then reverted to state control.See Figure 1 below for a brief chronology of key events in the crisis. Chronology of the 1992 Los Angeles Riots

Command and control · Criminology · Political science · Sociology · Disaster Management and Resilience · Engineering · Law · Public Administration

• Legal Aspects of Domestic Employment of the Army

  Thomas R Lujan•The US Army War College Quarterly…•1997

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• Terrorists, WMD, and the US Army Reserve

  C Mercier, Charles L Mercier•The US Army War College Quarterly…•1997

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• "Auftragstaktik," or Directive Control, in Joint and Combined Operations

  David M Keithly, Stephen P Ferris•The US Army War College Quarterly…•1999

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• The 1992 Los Angeles Riots and the Asian American Abandonment Narrative as Political Fiction

  Tamara K Nopper•CR The New Centennial Review•2006

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• Declaring Victory

  Kevin C M Benson, Christopher B Thrash•The US Army War College Quarterly…•1996

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