Allies and Airpower in Libya
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20140098 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Erica D Borghard (Columbia University, corresponding author), Costantino Pischedda (0000-0002-8784-8623, Columbia University) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Publication date | 2012-03-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-1723 • E-ISSN: 0031-1723 |
| Publisher | United States Army War College Press (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.55540/0031-1723.2617 |
| OpenAlex | W223594365 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 3 |
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in Libya was a success in several important respects: it helped topple Muammar Qaddafi's 42-year-old regime without the deployment of ground forces, with very low levels of collateral damage, and no NATO casualties. The successful overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, following a similar strategy (but with a greater emphasis on Special Operations Forces (SOF)), led a number of observers and analysts to herald the coming of a new way of war, known as the "Afghan model." 2 Proponents of the model point to its ability to achieve military success with a significantly lower cost in blood and national treasure than previous conventional operations. It should be noted that success here refers to operations against the opponent's conventional forces, not to the target state's prospects for long-term stability. In this respect, the jury is still out on Libya, with the government struggling to consolidate its rule. n important debate has emerged regarding the conditions under which the Afghan model is effective and, therefore, the extent to which it can serve as a template for future operations. In particular, the author and strategist Stephen Biddle warns against learning the wrong lessons from Afghanistan, arguing that the campaign succeeded primarily due to the parity in military skill of local US allies and the Taliban/al Qaeda fighters. In his view, precision airpower and SOF cannot compensate for a major imbalance in the skill of ground forces. 5 This analysis leads Biddle to claim that, "Syria and Iran, for example, are poor candidates for the Afghan model: Who is the trained local opposition in Syria or Iran?" 6 It appears that Libya would also be an unpromising candidate for the Afghan model due to the absence of a trained local opposition identifiable at the outset of the intervention. Consistent with this observation, Biddle expressed concern about the viability of the intervention in Libya, expecting that the outcome "could easily be a drawn-out, grinding stalemate." 7 Understanding why the poorly skilled opposition prevailed against superior government forces in Libya promises insight on the debate regarding the broader applicability of Erica D. Borghard is a Ph
Political economy · Political science · Sociology · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · Law · Military and Defense Studies · Military History and Strategy
| Citations per year | 0.09 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2015 - 2015 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |