The Continuum Fallacy in Moral Philosophy

Bibliographic Data

ID20141927
AuthorsJohn Broome (0000-0002-9421-889X, University of Oxford Oxford UK, corresponding author)
Year2026
Volume92
Issue1
Publication date2026-02-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.70045
OpenAlexW4415649941
LanguageEN
References cited19

‘Spectrum arguments’ or ‘continuum arguments’ in moral philosophy are sometimes invalid because they commit a particular fallacy I call the ‘Continuum Fallacy’. An important example is an argument in population ethics described by Derek Parfit, which purports to derive a conclusion that he and others find repugnant on the basis of a weak and plausible premise. Parfit treats this as a paradox, and takes up the challenge of resolving it, looking for a way to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion. The solution he offers depends on the existence of imprecision within the relation of betterness among populations of people. Other philosophers have taken up the same challenge, following Parfit's lead, and offered solutions also based on imprecision or incommensurability. I show that actually the Repugnant Conclusion is not implied by Parfit's appealing premise. There is therefore no paradox and no real challenge. Moreover, the explanation of why this is so has nothing to do with imprecision, incompleteness, incommensurability, indeterminacy or vagueness in betterness. It is consistent with a sharp, complete betterness ordering

Argument (complex analysis) · Commit · Fallacy · Indeterminacy (philosophy) · Nothing · Philosophy of science · Vagueness · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory

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