Introspection as a Game of Make‐Believe

Bibliographic Data

ID20141986
AuthorsWolfgang Barz (0000-0002-6902-2967, University of Duisburg-Essen, corresponding author)
Year2014
Volume80
Issue4
Pages350-367
Publication date2014-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12048
OpenAlexW1868026471
LanguageEN
References cited17

The aim of this article is to provide an account of introspective knowledge concerning visual experiences that is in accordance with the idea of transparent introspection. According to transparent introspection, a person gains knowledge of her own current mental state M solely by paying attention to those aspects of the external world which M is about. In my view, transparent introspection is a promising alternative to inner sense theories. However, it raises the fundamental question why a person who pays attention to something extra‐mental should be epistemically justified in holding a belief about something intra‐mental . In his N aturalizing the M ind , F red D retske solves this problem by conceiving of introspection concerning visual experiences as an inference based on a connecting belief. Although D retske's account proves defective upon closer inspection, its essence can be salvaged by looking upon introspection as being a game of make‐believe

Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Inference · Introspection · Mental image · Mental state · State (computer science) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology

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