Names and existence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20142018 |
|---|---|
| Authors | D Goldstick (0000-0002-6513-0346, Department of Philosophy University of Toronto Toronto Ontario Canada, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 90 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 643-651 |
| Publication date | 2024-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12565 |
| OpenAlex | W4403371661 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
In practice, the inquiry into whether Socrates/William Tell/Robin Hood really existed hinges on the origin of the causal sequence leading up to the present use of the name employed for the personage in question, even though the occurrence of a Kripkean ‘baptism’ is not a logical consequence of most assertions employing that name, but only an ‘implication’ like the sort that makes examples of Moore's paradox (e.g. 'It is raining, but I have no idea whether it is raining’) strike ordinary language users as ‘inconsistent’. But with any express assertions or denials of the existence of the personage named, the attribution of Kripkean sense to the name is unavoidable
Epistemology · Linguistics · Names, Identity, and Discrimination Research · Philosophy
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |