Akbarian Scepticism in Islam

Qūnawī's Sceptical Arguments from Relativity and Disagreement

Bibliographic Data

ID20142031
AuthorsYusuf Daşdemir (0000-0003-3223-5800, University of Jyväskylä, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume88
Issue1
Pages202-225
Publication date2022-02-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12298
OpenAlexW3128578912
LanguageEN
References cited26

This study deals with the sceptical arguments by one of the most important figures in the philosophical Sufi tradition (the Akbarian school) and the foremost disciple of Ibn ʿArabī, Ṣadr al‐Dīn al‐Qūnawī. Though not a sceptic in the strict sense, Qūnawī employs sceptical arguments from relativity of rational knowledge and disagreement among philosophers to prove inefficacy of reason and rational procedures of knowledge in terms of achieving certain knowledge of metaphysical matters, namely of God and the ultimate principles of things. The paper questions Qūnawī's implicit assumption that, if there is disagreement on a proposition p , then p is relative and thus cannot provide certain knowledge. It aims to philosophically analyse and assess his scepticism as well as to shed light on the largely unknown terrain of scepticism in the mediaeval Islamic world

Epistemology · Islam · Metaphysics · Proposition · Skepticism · Theology · Islamic Studies and History · Islamic Thought and Society Studies · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy

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