Subjective Externalism

Bibliographic Data

ID20142121
AuthorsSarah Sawyer (0000-0002-5919-3367, University of Sussex, corresponding author)
Year2018
Volume84
Issue1
Pages4-22
Publication date2018-02-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12137
OpenAlexW2770228369
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited27

In this article I argue for a novel theory of representational content, which I call ‘subjective externalism’. The view combines an internal, subjective constraint on the attribution of thought content which traditionally underpins internalist theories of thought, and an external, objective constraint on the attribution of thought content which traditionally underpins externalist theories of thought. While internalism and externalism are mutually inconsistent, the constraints to which each theory is committed are not. It is this realization that opens up the conceptual space for subjective externalism, according to which the correct attribution of thought content to an individual is essentially constrained by her nonrepresentational relations to objective manifest properties in her wider reality

Attribution · Constraint (computer-aided design) · Content (measure theory) · Epistemology · Externalism · Internalism and externalism · Realization (probability) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology

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