Arbitrary Reference and Weak Discernibility

Datos Bibliográficos

ID20142136
AutoresSofía Meléndez Gutiérrez (0000-0003-1786-158X, School of Social Sciences and Humanities University of Guadalajara Guadalajara Mexico, autor de correspondencia)
Año2026
Volumen92
Número2
Fecha de publicación2026-04-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaTheoria (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.70077
OpenAlexW7134200174
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas24

Two entities are weakly discernible when they share every single one of their intrinsic and relational properties, but a symmetric and irreflexive relation holds between them. The theory of arbitrary reference, first proposed by Breckenridge and Magidor in 2012, states that some semantic facts are brute. And, in this paper, I argue that this theory is inconsistent with the thesis that weakly discernible entities are metaphysically possible. For the advocates of arbitrary reference, this result is problematic for two independent reasons. First: the thesis that weakly discernible entities are metaphysically possible is strikingly plausible and supported by a variety of compelling arguments. If it is true, though, then the theory of arbitrary reference is false. And second: some of the applications that the theory of arbitrary reference has been claimed to have depend on the assumption that weakly discernible entities are metaphysically possible. Those who have tried to take advantage of said applications (e.g., ante rem structuralists) will find, consequently, that their projects are doomed to fail

Algebra over a field · Metaphysics · Relation (database) · Self-reference · Variety (cybernetics) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy and Theoretical Science