A philosophically neutral semantics for perception sentences
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20142151 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Samuele Iaquinto (0000-0001-5484-6659, Philosophy University of Turin Torino Italy, corresponding author), Giuseppe Spolaore (0000-0001-9420-2364, Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology, Education and Applied Psychology University of Padua Padova Italy) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 88 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 532-544 |
| Publication date | 2022-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12378 |
| OpenAlex | W4200606859 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 30 |
Jaakko Hintikka proposed treating objectual perception sentences, such as “Alice sees Bob,” as de re propositional perception sentences. Esa Saarinen extended Hintikka's idea to eventive perception sentences, such as “Alice sees Bob smile.” These approaches, elegant as they may be, are not philosophically neutral, for they presuppose, controversially, that the content of all perceptual experiences is propositional in nature. The aim of this paper is to propose a formal treatment of objectual and eventive perception sentences that builds on Hintikka's modal approach to propositional attitude ascriptions while avoiding controversial assumptions on the nature of perceptual experiences. Despite being simple and theoretically frugal, our approach is powerful enough to express a variety of interesting philosophical views about propositional, objectual, and eventive perception sentences, thus enabling the study of their inferential relationships
Alice (programming language) · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Linguistics · Modal · Perception · Semantics (computer science) · Variety (cybernetics) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
Perception
Knowledge and the flow of information
Origins of Objectivity
Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning
Events and ?logical form?
The ontology of physical objects
Imagination and Fiction
Dretske on Non‐Epistemic Seeing
Events and Situations
Perception Without Propositions
Absolute Actuality and the Plurality of Worlds
On situation semantics for perception
Seeing as
On the logic of perception sentences
Tropes and Supervenience
A Defense of Sense-Data
Between Perception and Action
Is Perception a Propositional Attitude
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |