Frege on Existence and Non‐existence
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 20142289 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Karen Green (0000-0001-7570-3577, The University of Melbourne) |
| Ano | 2015 |
| Volume | 81 |
| Fascículo | 4 |
| Páginas | 293-310 |
| Data de publicação | 2015-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12066 |
| OpenAlex | W1490523902 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 3 |
| Referências citadas | 10 |
Despite its importance for early analytic philosophy, G ottlob F rege's account of existence statements, according to which they classify concepts, has been thought to succumb to a number of well‐worn criticisms. This article does two things. First, it argues that, by remaining faithful to the letter of F rege's claim that concepts are functions, the F regean account can be saved from many of the standard criticisms. Second, it examines the problem that F rege's account fails to generalize to cases which involve definite descriptions and proper names. To deal with this the proffered analysis deviates from the letter of F rege's views, while remaining within its spirit. It proposes, in opposition to F rege, that expressions which grammatically look like singular terms should not always be read as referring to objects, but are sometimes best analysed as indicating functions
Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Mathematics · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Obras citantes distintas | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,75 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 3 |