The Manipulation Argument and a Kantian account of freedom

Datos Bibliográficos

ID20142295
AutoresByeong D Lee (0000-0001-7080-6702, Department of Philosophy Sungkyunkwan University Seoul Korea, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen90
Número6
Páginas567-582
Fecha de publicación2024-12-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaTheoria (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12556
OpenAlexW4402847636
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas2
Referencias citadas28

On Kant's view, we are rational beings who are morally responsible for our actions. The main goal of this paper is to show that this Kantian view of ourselves is not undermined by the Manipulation Argument, which is currently the biggest challenge to compatibilism. To this end, I argue that a Kantian account of freedom offers a new soft‐line reply to this argument. On this Kantian account, moral responsibility requires not only positive freedom but also negative freedom. An agent is free in the positive sense just in case the agent has the rational capacity to act in compliance with moral norms. And an agent lacks negative freedom regarding their actions when these actions are determined by internal or external factors beyond their rational control. Based on this Kantian account, I provide a principled explanation of why there is a significant difference between manipulated actions and merely causally determined actions regarding moral responsibility. In addition, I bring out the distinctive characteristics of my Kantian account further by comparing it with two competing conceptions of freedom: leeway freedom and sourcehood freedom

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Free Will and Agency · Medicine · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment