The Problem with Uniform Solutions to Peer Disagreement
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20142305 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Amir Konigsberg (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 79 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 96-126 |
| Publication date | 2013-05-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2012.01149.x |
| OpenAlex | W1485965675 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 24 |
Contributors to the recent disagreement debate have sought to provide a uniform response to cases in which epistemic peers disagree about the epistemic import of a shared body of evidence, no matter what kind of evidence they are disagreeing about. The varied cases addressed in the literature have included examples of disagreement about restaurant bills, court verdicts, weather forecasting, chess, morality, religious beliefs, and even disagreements about philosophical disagreements. The equal treatment of these varied cases has motivated the search for a uniform response to peer disagreement wherever it is encountered. In this article I challenge this prevalent approach in the literature. I grant the notion of epistemic peer and accept that being a peer may amount to the same thing in different domains; nonetheless I contend that different domains appear to call for different responses to disagreement. I argue that the appropriate response to finding out about a disagreement with a peer is different in different domains
Epistemology · Morality · Peer review · Political science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology
Fundamental disagreements and the limits of instrumentalism
Disagreement, peerhood, and three paradoxes of Conciliationism
Some lessons from simulations of scientific disagreements
Scientific Disagreements, Fast Science and Higher-Order Evidence
Peer Idealization and Internal Examples in the Epistemology of Disagreement
Not Just a Truthometer
Information, trade and common knowledge
Agreeing to Disagree
The base-rate fallacy in probability judgments
Reasonable Religious Disagreements
The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement
On the psychology of prediction.
Epistemology of Disagreement
Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge
Biased assimilation and attitude polarization
When do base rates affect predictions
The case for motivated reasoning
| Citations per year | 0.45 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2015 - 2023 (9) |
| Highly cited | No |