The expression theory again

Bibliographic Data

ID20142310
AuthorsDavie (0000-0002-2862-2050, University of Auckland, corresponding author), Stephen Davies (0000-0001-9821-6798)
Year1986
Volume52
Issue3
Pages146-167
Publication date1986-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1755-2567.1986.tb00107.x
OpenAlexW2001964737
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited25

In this paper I discuss a version of the Expression Theory of art.My aim is not to dwell upon the objections faced by this version of the theory, although the criticisms which it invites are both obvious and fatal.Rather, my concern is to explain the theory's attractiveness.Or perhaps I should say that my aim is to explain away the prima facie attractiveness of the theory, for my approach is not a sympathetic one.The initial plausibility of the theory, rather than hinting at a novel but important truth lying at the theory's heart, arises instead from a natural but mistaken characterisation of the relationship between artists' feelings and the expressive properties or powers of the works of art they create.* * * * * * * Many views have gone under the name "Expression Theory".Three types of so-called Expression Theory are not relevant to my discussion.I am not here concerned with attempts to define the meaning of "art" in terms of the expression of emotions (see Tolstoy, [1898Tolstoy, [ ] 1962)).Nor am I concerned with views the point of which is to insist that expressive properties, qualities, features or powers can be predicated truly of works of art (see Sircello, 1965Sircello, & 1972)).Nor am I interested in views the point of which is to claim that there need be nothing odd nor anything aesthetically illegitmate in a person's respon-ding emotionally to works of art (see Elliot, 1966-67).Views of the last two types do not deserve the title of "theory" since they testify to the facts which stand in need of explanation without attempting to provide that explanation.(The facts mentioned are these -that art is expressive of emotion in some way which typically gives rise to an emotional response.Not that aesthetic theory does not face obvious problems in accounting for the rationality of such responses -see Davies, 1983 A.) The version of the Expression Theory with which I am concerned is one which explains art's expressiveness as arising from artists' expressing their concurrent emotions or feelings in the production of art.The emotions read off from works of art are recognised and responded to as those of their creators; that is, they are recognised as emotions felt by artists and given expression through the act of creation.On this view, one can read off an artist's feelings from his or her art just as one can read off a person's sadness from his or her tears.The audience's emotional response to the expressiveness of an artwork is a response to that work as expressing emotions felt by its creator at the time of creation.That is, in its expressiveness an artwork reveals its creator's feelings and is responded to as doing so.The emotions expressed in an artwork, rather than being consciously and coolly designed into the artwork by its artist at a time of calm concentration, are somehow poured or discharged into the artwork during its creation.I1_ On this view artists express in their works emotions, feelings, moods or attitudes, rather than expressing ideas, suppositions or beliefs.I2_ That is to say, in the theory here under consideration, the expression of emotion in art is thought not to be compared usefully to the expression of thought in words, although some theorists might talk loosely of art as a 'language' with which artists 'communicate' with their audiences.It might be objected that the version of the Expression Theory which I have chosen to discuss is an unacceptably crude example of the theory.More sophisticated versions of the theory appreciate and attempt to avoid the power-ful difficulties faced by the theory I have characterised.To this objection I reply as follows: The version of the theory I discuss is its AUr_-form; other versions are sophistications upon this proto-theory in that they attempt to

Citation · Expression (computer science) · Library science · Programming language · Computer Science · Cultural Insights and Digital Impacts · Linguistics and Discourse Analysis · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education

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