The Normative Force of Logical and Probabilistic Reasoning in Improving Beliefs
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20142314 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Corina Strößner (0000-0001-9464-5114, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 85 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 435-458 |
| Publication date | 2019-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12214 |
| OpenAlex | W2994662197 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 27 |
There is a deep tension between logical and probabilistic norms of belief. This article illustrates the normative force that is associated with these frameworks by showing how rather unrestricted belief bases can be improved by undergoing logical and probabilistic reflection. It is argued that probabilistic reasoning accounts for the reliability of the conclusions one can draw from the beliefs. Most importantly, reliability commands us to care for the increasing uncertainty of conjunctions of beliefs. Deductive logic captures the agent's commitment towards all conclusions of her beliefs. In other words, it seems that commitment forces the agent to believe conclusions, which reliability tells her to view with scepticism. This conflict is resolved by arguing that commitment merely forces the agent to find the logical conclusions of her beliefs acceptable, not necessarily to believe them. This demands consistency but no deductive closure. Furthermore, it is shown that by restoring consistency, a straightforward connection between high subjective probability and full belief is undermined. Finally, the article delineates how this approach deals with the lottery paradox and the preface paradox
Belief revision · Consistency (knowledge bases) · Epistemology · Normative · Probabilistic argumentation · Probabilistic logic · Reliability (semiconductor) · Skepticism · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing
The Laws of Belief
The Stability of Belief
Putting Logic in its Place
Betting on Theories
Belief, credence, and norms
Belief and Acceptance
Belief is weak
The paradox of the preface
A Dialogical, Multi-Agent Account of the Normativity of Logic
Against Deductive Closure
From Degrees of Belief to Binary Beliefs
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Probability 1
A geo-logical solution to the lottery paradox, with applications to conditional logic
Medieval Obligationes as Logical Games of Consistency Maintenance
The Stability Theory of Belief
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |