Locke on Sensitive Knowledge as Knowledge 1
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20142348 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Scott Stapleford (0000-0002-2394-2418, Thomas University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 75 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 206-231 |
| Publication date | 2009-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2009.01040.x |
| OpenAlex | W2020820660 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 9 |
This article is an extended analysis of the most recent scholarly work on Locke's account of sensitive knowledge. Lex Newman's “dual cognitive relations” model of sensitive knowledge is examined in detail. The author argues that the dual cognitive relations model needs to be revised on both philosophical and historical grounds. While no attempt is made to defend Locke's position, the aim is to show that it is at least consistent, contrary to the received view. The final section provides textual support for the interpretation
Cognition · Dual (grammatical number) · Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy) · Linguistics · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophy · Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
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