A new case of the Myth of the Given

Bibliographic Data

ID20142352
AuthorsDaniel Kalpokas (0000-0001-6137-6990, Institute of Humanities, National Scientific and Technical Research Council National University of Cordoba Córdoba Argentina, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume88
Issue5
Pages927-942
Publication date2022-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12423
OpenAlexW4282599110
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited51

For some years now, an increasing number of philosophers have been holding that what is given in perception are the physical objects of our surroundings. This is the view called, among others names, “the Relational View”. Basically, this view consists in the claim that experience is not representational, it is not a matter of the subject's taking things in the world to be this or that way; rather, it is just a matter of being presented with things, of being in a certain kind of relation with them, which makes them available to us, nevertheless, to be represented in judgement or belief. The question arises, however, whether this does not imply a new fall into the Myth of the Given. In this article, I argue for an affirmative response to that question

Epistemology · Judgement · Mythology · Perception · Relation (database) · Sociology · Subject (documents) · Subject matter · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Tools

Open DOI