The preface paradox dissolved
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20142368 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John N Williams (0000-0002-5473-5382, National University of Singapore, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1987 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 2-3 |
| Pages | 121-140 |
| Publication date | 1987-08-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1755-2567.1987.tb00706.x |
| OpenAlex | W2141797838 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 17 |
The preface paradox strikes us as puzzling because we feel that if a person holds a set of inconsistent beliefs, i.e. beliefs such that at least one of them must be incorrect, then he should give at least one of them up. Equally, if a person’s belief is rational, then he has a
Citation · Library science · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Publishing and Scholarly Communication
| Citations per year | 0.2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2021 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |