Fundamental Yet Grounded

Bibliographic Data

ID20142467
AuthorsJoaquim Giannotti (0000-0002-4058-4093, Department of Philosophy University of Birmingham UK, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume87
Issue3
Pages578-599
Publication date2021-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12293
OpenAlexW3106449715
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited22

Grounding is claimed to offer a promising characterization of the fundamental as that which is ungrounded. Detractors of this view argue that there can be fundamental and yet mutually grounded entities. Such a possibility undermines the definition of the fundamental as the ungrounded. I aim to show, however, that the possibility of fundamental mutually grounded entities does not force us to renounce the prospects of characterizing fundamentality in terms of grounding. To accomplish this aim, I defend a grounding‐based view that accommodates fundamental mutually grounded entities straightforwardly. My definition of fundamentality is similar to, but importantly different from, one that Karen Bennett discusses. I conclude by resisting two objections raised by Jessica Wilson against the Bennettian framework that also target the proposed view

Electrical engineering · Epistemology · Ground · Grounded theory · Qualitative research · Social science · Sociology · Engineering · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access