From Falsemakers to Negative Properties

Bibliographic Data

ID20142471
AuthorsMichele Paolini Paoletti (0000-0001-7278-2281, University of Macerata, corresponding author)
Year2017
Volume83
Issue1
Pages53-77
Publication date2017-02-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12113
OpenAlexW2559001868
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited22

I shall argue in this article that, if we need to admit of negative facts in our ontology as falsemakers of false propositions (as I try to demonstrate in a 2014 article by a falsemaker argument), then it is plausible to accept that there are also negative properties conceived of as modes. After having briefly recalled the falsemaker argument, I shall explore five different alternative interpretations of negative facts and I shall demonstrate that each alternative – except for the one involving negative properties – is affected by some problems. Later on, I shall deal with a number of objections against negative properties and I shall demonstrate that they can be overcome without much difficulty. Eventually, I shall tackle Nick Zangwill's argument against the thesis that negative properties are as real as positive ones. Among other things, I shall argue that Zangwill's argument is at least limited in its scope, since it only works with negative and positive determinates within some common determinable

Argument (complex analysis) · Economics · Epistemology · Ontology · Positive economics · Scope (computer science) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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