Deontological Conservatism and Perceptual Justification
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20142520 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hamid Vahid (0000-0001-9064-0877, School of Analytic Philosophy Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 83 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 206-224 |
| Publication date | 2017-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12118 |
| OpenAlex | W2605976399 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 21 |
Crispin Wright has advanced a number of arguments to show that, in addition to evidential warrant, we have a species of non‐evidential warrant, namely, “entitlement”, which forms the basis of a particular view of the architecture of perceptual justification known as “epistemic conservatism”. It is widely known, however, that Wright's conservative view is beset by a number of problems. In this article, I shall argue that the kind of warrant that emerges from Wright's account is not the standard truth‐conducive justification, but what is known as the deontological conception of justification. It will be argued that the deontological justification has features that make it a better candidate for representing a conservative architecture. These results will be reinforced by showing how the deontological framework can make better sense of a recent theory of justified (reasonable) belief that takes its inspiration from Wright's conservative account. Thus understood, we may see the liberalism–conservatism controversy as actually an extension of the older debate over which conception of justification, truth‐conducive or deontological, can best represent the epistemic status of our belief‐forming practices
Conservatism · Deontological ethics · Economics · Entitlement (fair division) · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Perception · Political science · Warrant · Wright · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Forgiveness and Related Behaviors · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
The Theory of Epistemic Rationality
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?
Concepts of Epistemic Justification
I—Crispin Wright
The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification
Strong and Weak Justification
Entitlement, value and rationality
Wittgenstein and the groundlessness of our believing
Entitlement and rationality
Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism
(Anti‐)Sceptics Simple and Subtle
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |