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Knowing the Answer to a Loaded Question

Bibliographic Data

ID20142584
AuthorsAsbjørn Steglich-Petersen (0000-0002-5023-3449, Aarhus University, corresponding author), Asbjørn Steglich‐petersen (Aarhus University)
Year2015
Volume81
Issue2
Pages97-125
Publication date2015-05-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12045
OpenAlexW1868019375
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited31

Many epistemologists have been attracted to the view that knowledge‐ wh can be reduced to knowledge‐ that . An important challenge to this, presented by J onathan S chaffer, is the problem of “convergent knowledge”: reductive accounts imply that any two knowledge‐ wh ascriptions with identical true answers to the questions embedded in their wh ‐clauses are materially equivalent, but according to S chaffer, there are counterexamples to this equivalence. Parallel to this, S chaffer has presented a very similar argument against binary accounts of knowledge, and thereby in favour of his alternative contrastive account, relying on similar examples of apparently inequivalent knowledge ascriptions, which binary accounts treat as equivalent. In this article, I develop a unified diagnosis and solution to these problems for the reductive and binary accounts, based on a general theory of knowledge ascriptions that embed presuppositional expressions. All of S chaffer's apparent counterexamples embed presuppositional expressions, and once the effect of these is taken into account, it becomes apparent that the counterexamples depend on an illicit equivocation of contexts. Since epistemologists often rely on knowledge ascriptions that embed presuppositional expressions, the general theory of them presented here will have ramifications beyond defusing S chaffer's argument

Argument (complex analysis) · Arithmetic · Binary number · Cognitive science · Counterexample · Discrete mathematics · Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Equivalence (formal languages) · Equivocation · Mathematical economics · Philosophy of science · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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    Open Access•Jonathan Schaffer•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2007

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Citations per year0.5
Citation span2024 - 2024 (1)
Highly citedNo

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