Does Perceiving Entail Knowing
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20142852 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John Turri (0000-0001-7611-2824, Huron (France), corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 76 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 197-206 |
| Publication date | 2010-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01065.x |
| OpenAlex | W2102044719 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 19 |
| References cited | 14 |
This article accomplishes two closely connected things. First, it refutes an influential view about the relationship between perception and knowledge. In particular, it demonstrates that perceiving does not entail knowing. Second, it leverages that refutation to demonstrate that knowledge is not the most general factive propositional attitude
Cognitive science · Epistemology · Perception · Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology
Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge
Awareness by degree
Reasons First
Lying
Social work on the edge
Vision, knowledge, and assertion
Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge
Epistemological Disjunctivism's Genuine Access Problem
Has Williamson's Claim that Knowledge Is the most General Factive Mental State Been Disproved
Seeing Things
Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation
The Formulation of Epistemological Disjunctivism
Luck, propositional perception, and the Entailment Thesis
Cook Wilson on knowledge and forms of thinking
The bifurcated conception of perceptual knowledge
Reading as a source of knowledge
Semantic relativism and ways of knowing
Possessing reasons
From seeing to knowing
| Unique citing works | 19 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,36 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2025 (14) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 17 |