You Can Trust the Ladder, But You Shouldn't

Bibliographic Data

ID20142856
AuthorsJonathan Tallant (0000-0002-8085-3104, University of Nottingham, corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume85
Issue2
Pages102-118
Publication date2019-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12177
OpenAlexW2912453487
LanguageEN
Citations received12
References cited14

My claim in this article is that, contra what I take to be the orthodoxy in the wider literature, we do trust inanimate objects – per the example in the title, there are cases where people really do trust a ladder (to hold their weight, for instance), and, perhaps most importantly, that this poses a challenge to that orthodoxy. My argument consists of four parts. In Section 2 I introduce an alleged distinction between trust as mere reliance and trust as a rich, morally loaded notion. In the course of doing so, I briefly sketch some models of trust. This will help us to get a handle on how some of the mainstream models of trust preclude or ignore the trusting of inanimate objects. In Section 3 I introduce cases designed to show that we have reason to think that we do trust inanimate objects. In Section 4 I consider an objection, and in Section 5 I discuss some consequences of this finding, before concluding in Section 6

Argument (complex analysis) · Blind trust · Epistemology · Express trust · Mainstream · Orthodoxy · Political science · Section (typography) · Sketch · Sociology · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Organ Donation and Transplantation · Philosophy

Tools

Open DOISci-HubOpen Access