Propositions, Truth and Belief

The Wittgenstein‐Russell Dispute

Bibliographic Data

ID20142869
AuthorsHerbert Hochberg (The University of Texas at Austin, corresponding author)
Year2000
Volume66
Issue1
Pages3-40
Publication date2000-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1755-2567.2000.tb01143.x
OpenAlexW2120730581
LanguageEN
Citations received6

Russell's 1913 manuscript Theory of Knowledge was not published until 1984. He supposedly abandoned the main part of the manuscript, while publishing the first six chapters as articles in The Monist, due to Wittgenstein's criticisms of his “multiple relation” analysis of belief. There have been numerous unsuccessful and erroneous attempts to interpret the manuscript, including those of D. Pears and G. Landini. The paper explores the Russell‐Wittgenstein “controversy” and shows the radical way Russell altered his earlier versions of his analysis of belief and the connections the changes had to his new, and very important, analyses of relational order, of truth as correspondence, and of propositions. Russell's analysis of relational order reveals the first recognition by a correspondence theorist of a fundamental problem the correspondence theory faces as well as a long overlooked and unappreciated application Russell made of his theory of definite descriptions

Coherence theory of truth · Epistemology · Monism · Order (exchange) · Philosophical analysis · Pragmatic theory of truth · Relation (database) · Computer Science · Philosophy · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications

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