Anderson’s Restriction of Deontic Modalities to Contingent Propositions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20142900 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matteo Pascucci (0000-0003-4867-4082, TU Wien, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 83 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 440-470 |
| Publication date | 2017-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12135 |
| OpenAlex | W2768494634 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 11 |
The deontic status of tautologies and contradictions is one of the major puzzles for authors of early works on deontic logic. It is well‐known that von Wright (1951) addresses this problem by adopting a Principle of Deontic Contingency , which says that tautologies are not necessarily obligatory and contradictions are not necessarily forbidden. A more radical solution is proposed by Anderson (1956) within a reductionist approach to deontic logic and consists in restricting the range of application of deontic modalities to contingent propositions. Anderson’s solution has not received much attention in the literature, despite reflecting a typical feature of ordinary deontic reasoning, where non‐contingent propositions are rarely, if ever, taken into account. In the present article we explore some of its formal consequences, providing a taxonomy of the properties of the Andersonian operators of obligation and permission for contingent propositions, O′ and P′ , in the class of normal alethic systems
Contingency · Deontic logic · Epistemology · Normative · Permission · Advanced Algebra and Logic · Computer Science · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |