Getting a grip
On causation, agency, and the meaning of “manipulation”
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20143013 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Erik van Aken (0000-0001-6603-5175, Philosophy and Religious Studies Rocky Mountain College Billings Montana USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 88 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 1228-1247 |
| Publication date | 2022-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12437 |
| OpenAlex | W4307849819 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 25 |
In the philosophy of causation, manipulationist literature is broadly divided into agency and interventionist accounts. The division between these accounts is partially due to a dispute regarding the meaning of “manipulation”, which specifically questions, “Must one analyse manipulation by appealing to human agency?” This paper attempts to clarify the notion of manipulation and defends the thesis that agency theorists and interventionists analyse manipulation by appealing to human agency. However, following Collingwood's work, I argue that there are two ways to interpret “human agency”. With an extended notion of agency in place, I reveal a pathway towards a consensus between the agency and interventionist accounts. Further, I highlight the alleged discrepancies between agency and interventionist accounts, including the issues of scope and objectivity, and suggest additional pathways towards a consensus
Agency (philosophy) · Causation · Epistemology · Law and economics · Meaning (existential) · Political science · Scope (computer science) · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Highly cited | No |
|---|