We Should Not Be a Counterpart Theorist of Events If We Want to Be a Counterfactual Theorist of Causation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20143032 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Zhiheng Tang (0000-0001-9967-7246, School of Philosophy Huazhong University of Science and Technology, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 87 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 1038-1049 |
| Publication date | 2021-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12321 |
| OpenAlex | W3164785079 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 7 |
Although David Lewis advocates a counterpart‐theoretic treatment of objects but rejects a parallel treatment of events, many philosophers have — mainly to solve some puzzles within the framework of a Lewisian counterfactual analysis of causation — suggested that the counterpart‐theoretic treatment be extended to events. This article argues that we had better not be a counterpart theorist of events as long as we want to remain at all faithful to the counterfactual analysis of causation
Causation · Counterfactual conditional · Counterfactual thinking · Economics · Epistemology · Positive economics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |