Flat Physicalism

Dados Bibliográficos

ID20143091
AutoresMeir Hemmo (0000-0002-0752-1269, University of Haifa Haifa Israel), Orly Shenker (0000-0001-5716-6894, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Jerusalem Israel, autor correspondente)
Ano2022
Volume88
Fascículo4
Páginas743-764
Data de publicação2022-08-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoTheoria (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12396
OpenAlexW4220978929
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas9
Referências citadas40

This paper describes a version of type identity physicalism, which we call Flat Physicalism , and shows how it meets several objections often raised against identity theories. This identity theory is informed by recent results in the conceptual foundations of physics, and in particular clarifies the notion of ‘physical kinds' in light of a conceptual analysis of the paradigmatic case of reducing thermodynamics to statistical mechanics. We show how Flat Physicalism is compatible with the appearance of multiple realisation in the special sciences, and how and in what sense the special sciences laws are autonomous from the laws of physics, despite the full reductive picture of Flat Physicalism. We compare our view with a recent proposal by William Bechtel that accounts for the appearance of levels in mechanistic explanations

Epistemology · Identity (music) · Metaphysics · Physicalism · Physics · Quantum mechanics · Realisation · Advanced Thermodynamics and Statistical Mechanics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Quantum Mechanics and Applications