Action‐Individuation and Doxastic Agency
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20143096 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrei A Buckareff (0000-0002-0606-1352, Marist College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 77 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 312-332 |
| Publication date | 2011-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2011.01113.x |
| OpenAlex | W1583530038 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 34 |
In this article, I challenge the dominant view of the importance of the debate over action‐individuation. On the dominant view, it is held that the conclusions we reach about action‐individuation make little or no difference for other debates in the philosophy of action, much less in other areas of philosophy. As a means of showing that the dominant view is mistaken, I consider the implications of accepting a given theory of action‐individuation for thinking about doxastic agency. In particular, I am interested in the implications for thinking about the variety of evaluative control we can exercise over the formation of our doxastic attitudes. I show that our assumptions about how to individuate actions matters for how we think about doxastic agency and, hence, the conclusions we reach about action‐individuation are of greater significance than some have thought
Action (physics) · Agency (philosophy) · Doxastic logic · Epistemology · Individuation · Psychoanalysis · Sense of agency · Unconscious mind · Variety (cybernetics) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,11 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2017 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |