Towards a sensible bifurcationism (concerning what grounds thought about particulars)
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20143123 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jessica Pepp (0000-0002-1177-4242, Uppsala University Uppsala Sweden, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 88 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 348-364 |
| Publication date | 2022-04-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12377 |
| OpenAlex | W4200411203 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 29 |
In virtue of what are particular individuals or objects thought about ? I call this the grounding question . A consensus answer is bifurcationism : objects can be thought about in virtue of both satisfactional grounds—roughly, in virtue of their unique satisfaction of conditions that figure in a subject's thought—and non‐satisfactional grounds. Bifurcationism is a consensus view, but it comes in different flavours that correspond to different approaches to answering the grounding question. This paper draws on Saul Kripke's approach to linguistic reference in order to make recommendations about how to move toward a sensible bifurcationism concerning what grounds thought about particulars
Epistemology · Subject (documents) · Virtue · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation
Designation
V.—Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?
Ii.—proper Names
The Things We Mean
Individuals
Attitudes De Dicto and De Se
Ethics, Supervenience and Ramsey Sentences
Reality and Its Structure
Intentionality, an essay in the philosophy of mind
Beyond Concepts
Mental files
| Highly cited | No |
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