An Inconsistent Triad

Priority Pluralism, Perdurantism and (the Possibility of) Gunky Time

Bibliographic Data

ID20143161
AuthorsJamie Taylor (0000-0002-9958-0871, Durham University UK, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume86
Issue2
Pages268-285
Publication date2020-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12235
OpenAlexW3011691037
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited30

Priority pluralism, perdurantism and that temporal gunk – where some interval of time is gunky iff every interval of it has a proper subinterval – is at least metaphysically possible, are three commonly held views in contemporary metaphysics. However, there cannot be a temporally gunky world where objects perdure, and where there are mereological simples. Given that – as I will argue – pluralists should be committed to atomism, and cannot plausibly revise their view to accommodate temporal gunk if they are perdurantists, pluralism is incompatible with the combination of temporal gunk and perdurantism. Therefore, priority pluralism, perdurantism and the possibility of temporal gunk are jointly incompatible, and at least one of these views must be false. Subsequently, it means that at least one of the following views must be true: priority monism or metaphysical infinitism; endurantism; and/or that time is atomistic. The triad's inconsistency, then, has some interesting metaphysical implications

Atomism · Epistemology · Mereology · Metaphysics · Monism · Pluralism (philosophy) · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil

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