Aspects of a logical theory of assertion and inference

Bibliographic Data

ID20143252
AuthorsAnsten Klev (0000-0003-1091-284X, Czech Academy of Sciences ‐ Institute of Philosophy Prague Czech Republic, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume90
Issue5
Pages534-555
Publication date2024-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12539
OpenAlexW4401073856
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited34

The aim here is to investigate assertion and inference as notions of logic. Assertion will be explained in terms of its purpose, which is to give interlocutors the right to request the assertor to do a certain task. The assertion is correct if, and only if, the assertor knows how to do this task. Inference will be explained as an assertion equipped with what I shall call a justification profile, a strategy for making good on the assertion. The inference is valid if, and only if, correctness is preserved from the premiss assertions to the conclusion assertion. Most of this is a spelling out of views on assertion and inference presented by Per Martin‐Löf in lectures since 2015

Algorithm · Assertion · Cognitive science · Correctness · Epistemology · Inference · Programming language · Task (project management) · Computer Science · Logic, programming, and type systems · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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