Towards a Thoroughly Kripkean Theory of Proper Name Reference

Bibliographic Data

ID20143300
AuthorsAndrea Bianchi (0000-0003-3544-9548, Department of Humanities, Social Sciences and Cultural Industries University of Parma Parma Italy, corresponding author)
Year2026
Volume92
Issue3
Publication date2026-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.70078
OpenAlexW7147670006
LanguageEN
References cited23

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, both Saul Kripke and Keith Donnellan challenged descriptivist theories of proper names, arguing that reference—at least in their case—is basically a historical relation. However, as has become increasingly recognised over the past decade, their pictures differ substantially: when confronted with a token of a proper name, Kripke emphasises its historical connection to previous tokens of that name, whereas Donnellan focuses on the mental state of the speaker that leads to its production. In recent years, various philosophers have sought to develop either Kripke's or Donnellan's picture into a theory, often criticising the alternative. The latest development in this debate is found in Jessica Pepp's forthcoming article, ‘Towards a New “Kripke‐Donnellan Theory” of Proper Name Reference’. In this paper, I reconstruct the main stages of the debate and critically assess Pepp's proposed compromise between Kripke's and Donnellan's views on proper name reference. I aim to show, first, that the two views are fundamentally irreconcilable, and, second, that there are compelling reasons to favour Kripke's

Compromise · Mental state · Proper noun · Security token · State (computer science) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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