Are Identities Unexplainable? Towards a Non‐causal Contrastive Explanation of Identities

Bibliographic Data

ID20143358
AuthorsLorenzo Azzano (0000-0002-2523-5821, University of Bergamo Italy, corresponding author), Massimiliano Carrara (0000-0002-3509-1585, University of Padova Italy)
Year2021
Volume87
Issue2
Pages457-482
Publication date2021-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12281
OpenAlexW3090719895
LanguageEN
References cited26

Can an identity be the proper subject of an explanation? A popular stance, albeit not one often argued for, gives a negative answer to this question. Building from a contentious passage from Jaegwon Kim in this direction, we reconstruct an argument to the conclusion that identities, to the extent in which they are necessary, cannot be explained. The notion of contrastive explanation, characterized as difference‐seeking, will be crucial for this argument; however, we will eventually find the argument to be unsatisfactory. On the contrary, the discussion provides enough resources to sketch a very simple framework for a non‐causal contrastive explanation of identities. Many instances will be provided, with different varieties of explanans , ultimately suggesting that certain entailment or biconditional principles involving identities (first and foremost, so‐called two‐level identity criteria) may indeed be taken to have an inherent explanatory value

Aesthetics · Algorithm · Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Identity (music) · Linguistics · Logical consequence · Simple (philosophy) · Sketch · Subject (documents) · Value (mathematics) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology

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