Epistemic Normativity as Performance Normativity
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20143363 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tsung‐Hsing Ho (0000-0002-6450-1766, Academia Sinica, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 82 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 274-284 |
| Publication date | 2016-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12098 |
| OpenAlex | W2337857892 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 13 |
Virtue epistemology maintains that epistemic normativity is a kind of performance normativity, according to which evaluating a belief is like evaluating a sport or musical performance. I examine this thesis through the objection that a belief cannot be evaluated as a performance because it is not a performance but a state. I argue that virtue epistemology can be defended on the grounds that we often evaluate a performance through evaluating the result of the performance. The upshot of my account is that when a belief is evaluated under performance normativity, what we evaluate is not belief, but cognitive performance. My account of virtue epistemology offers a simple explanation of why knowledge is more valuable than true belief
Epistemic virtue · Epistemology · Virtue · Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.17 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2020 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |