Feeling Virtue

An Enactive Theory of Approval

Bibliographic Data

ID20143383
AuthorsRafael Graebin Vogelmann (0000-0001-9582-8465, Department of Philosophy Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM) Santa Maria Brazil, corresponding author)
Year2026
Publication date2026-04-26
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.70090
OpenAlexW7155700845
LanguageEN
References cited22

A neo‐sentimentalist theory of virtue holds that a trait is virtue if, and only if, it merits approval. Neo‐sentimentalists tend to be sceptical about the prospect of such a theory because it seems unlikely that feelings of approval can be characterised without reference to the notion of virtue. I argue that that scepticism is uncalled for. My argument is grounded on an enactive approach to affectivity according to which meaning is enacted by autonomous systems and perceptions of affordances are affective responses that present their objects as meaningful. In line with this approach, I argued for two points. First, relationships are autonomous systems of patterns of interaction and the meaning of the evaluative distinction between qualities and defects of character is a matter of how character traits impact on the viability conditions of a relationship. Second, this evaluative distinction is experienced in the form of the perception of a family of affiliative or anti‐affiliative affordances. As a result, feelings of approval can be characterised as perceptions of affiliative affordances that appraise their objects as traits that render one suitable for association as a social partner. This shows that a substantive and informative neo‐sentimentalist theory of virtue is a viable position

Affordance · Argument (complex analysis) · Feeling · Meaning (existential) · Perception · Skepticism · Virtue · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophical Ethics and Theory

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