Is Knowledge Closed Under Known Entailment? The Strange Case of Hawthorne's “Heavyweight Conjunct” (and Other Strange Cases)
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 20143428 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Mark McBride (0000-0002-7691-8198, University of Oxford, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2009 |
| Volumen | 75 |
| Número | 2 |
| Páginas | 117-128 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2009-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Editorial | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2009.01036.x |
| OpenAlex | W2010262632 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 13 |
Take the following principle (or schema) as the focus of the ensuing discussion (“P” and “Q” are placeholders for propositions): (Closure) If one knows P and competently deduces Q from P, thereby coming to believe Q, while retaining one's knowledge that P, one comes to know that Q. My strategy in outline: first, I want to set out Fred Dretske's classic challenge to (Closure) – a challenge which began in 1970–1971. Then I want to consider a specific, recent counter-challenge to Dretske's challenge to (Closure) mounted by John Hawthorne, and to defend Dretske's challenge from Hawthorne's counter-challenge. Doing this is not to invalidate (Closure). In this regard my conclusions are modest: Dretske's challenge to (Closure) is – or, better: can be made – sophisticated and, so far, unmet
Closure (psychology) · Epistemology · Focus (optics) · Hawthorne effect · Information retrieval · Physics · Political science · Schema (genetic algorithms) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |