Identifying with Our Desires
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20143563 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christian Miller (0000-0002-3782-6661, Wake Forest University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 79 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 127-154 |
| Publication date | 2013-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12008 |
| OpenAlex | W1598469110 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 39 |
A number of philosophers have become convinced that the best way of trying to understand human agency is by arriving at an account of identification. My goal here is not to criticize particular views about identification, but rather to examine several assumptions which have been widely held in the literature and yet which, in my view, render implausible any account of identification that takes them on board. In particular, I argue that typically identification does not involve either reflective consideration of our mental states or endorsement of those states. If it did, we would rarely be agents
Agency (philosophy) · Epistemology · Identification (biology) · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Responsibility and Control
What Happens When Someone Acts?
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions
A Desire of One’s Own
The Importance of What We Care About
Three Concepts of Free Action
Free Agency
Freedom within Reason
Necessity, Volition, and Love
Internalism About Reasons for Action
The importance of what we care about
Freedom and Desire
Explaining Action
Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency
Skepticism about Weakness of Will
The Structure of Justification
Iceberg Epistemology
Intentionality
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |