On a body‐switching argument in defence of the immateriality of human nature

Bibliographic Data

ID20143575
AuthorsPirooz Fatoorchi (0000-0002-6344-3218, Independent Scholar Tehran Iran, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume90
Issue1
Pages17-29
Publication date2024-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12505
OpenAlexW4388689718
LanguageEN
References cited40

In an earlier paper in Theoria , I discussed an argument based on the idea of “soul‐switching” that attempted to undermine the immaterialist account of human beings. The present paper deals with a parity argument against that argument in which the idea of “body‐switching” plays a pivotal role. I call these two arguments, that have been reported by Razi (d. 1210), respectively “the soul‐switching argument” and “the body‐switching argument”. After some introductory remarks, section 2 of the paper describes the structure of the latter argument. Section 3 considers some philosophical discussions in the ancient, modern, and contemporary eras in which the idea of body‐switching (or some similar conception) plays a major role. In the following section 4, some criticisms of the argument are discussed and a general response that is meant to cover a broad range of objections is considered. This paper shows that the body‐switching argument reported by Razi is a methodological antecedent of several contemporary arguments in defence of substance dualism

Antecedent (behavioral psychology) · Argument (complex analysis) · Dualism · Epistemology · Section (typography) · Soul · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Medicine · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology

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