Understanding by Testimony

A Reply to Malfatti

Bibliographic Data

ID20143686
AuthorsEric Gilbertson (0000-0002-0165-9072, Texas State University USA, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume86
Issue4
Pages528-534
Publication date2020-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12263
OpenAlexW3044549566
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited6

Federica Malfatti criticizes recent arguments against the possibility of understanding transmission. While she offers no positive argument for the claim that understanding can be transmitted, she does defend a liberal conception of transmission that allows for the possibility of understanding transmission. In this article, I have three aims. First, I will show that there is a stronger version of one of the arguments against understanding transmission that Malfatti considers, which avoids her objection. This argument also fails, however, and the reason it fails suggests that if understanding cannot be transmitted this is not due to the nature of epistemic trust. Second, I will offer a positive argument for understanding transmission on Malfatti's behalf, and defend the view of understanding on which it depends. Finally, I will raise a further challenge to the proponent of understanding transmission. The upshot is that although Malfatti is right that we have no clear reason to exclude the possibility of understanding transmission – and, if I am right, we have positive reason to accept it – nevertheless a puzzle remains about such transmission

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Transmission (telecommunications) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Historical Philosophy and Science · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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