Close Error, Visual Perception, and Neural Phase
A Critique of the Modal Approach to Knowledge
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20143751 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Adam Michael Bricker (0000-0003-1509-3302, Cologne Center for Contemporary Epistemology and the Kantian Tradition, Department of Philosophy University of Cologne, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 87 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 1123-1152 |
| Publication date | 2021-10-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12334 |
| OpenAlex | W3178651437 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 65 |
The distinction between true belief and knowledge is one of the most fundamental in philosophy, and a remarkable effort has been dedicated to formulating the conditions on which true belief constitutes knowledge. For decades, much of this epistemological undertaking has been dominated by a single strategy, referred to here as the modal approach . Shared by many of the most widely influential constraints on knowledge, including the sensitivity, safety, and anti‐luck/risk conditions, this approach rests on a key underlying assumption — the modal profiles available to known and unknown beliefs are in some way asymmetrical. The first aim of this paper is to deconstruct this assumption, identifying its plausibility with the way in which epistemologists frequently conceptualize human perceptual systems as excluding certain varieties of close error under conditions conducive to knowledge acquisition. The second aim of this paper is to then argue that a neural phase phenomenon indicates that this conceptualization is quite likely mistaken. This argument builds on the previous introduction of this neural phase to the context of epistemology, expanding the use of neural phase cases beyond relatively narrow questions about epistemic luck to a much more expansive critique of the modal approach as a whole
Argument (complex analysis) · Cognitive science · Conceptualization · Context (archaeology) · Epistemology · Luck · Metaphysics · Modal · Perception · Philosophy of mind · Artificial Intelligence · Clinical Reasoning and Diagnostic Skills · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · History · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Judgment and Agency
Knowledge and its Limits
Between Probability and Certainty
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology
Conclusive reasons
What is Justified Belief?
Shaping Functional Architecture by Oscillatory Alpha Activity
A Causal Theory of Knowing
Epistemic Operators
The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology
Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology
Unreasonable Knowledge
Anti-risk epistemology and negative epistemic dependence
Neural phase
The information effect
Propositional epistemic luck, epistemic risk, and epistemic justification
Safety in Sosa
Against global method safety
Global safety
Anti-luck epistemology
Saving safety from counterexamples
Worries about Pritchard’s safety
In Defense of Sensitivity
Easy Possibilities
Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals
The Causal Indicator Analysis of Knowledge
Philosophical Explanations
Philosophical investigations
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |