Derrida, art and truth
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 20156769 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Gerrit Olivier (0000-0002-9681-592X, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 1985 |
| Volume | 1 |
| Fascículo | 3 |
| Páginas | 27-38 |
| Data de publicação | 1985-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Journal of Literary Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0256-4718 • E-ISSN: 1753-5387 |
| Editora | Unisa Press (PUBLISHER • ZA) |
| DOI | 10.1080/02564718508529760 |
| OpenAlex | W1983444071 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 12 |
This article examines the consequences of Derrida's strategy of deconstruction for the notion of ‘truth’ in art and aesthetics. Its point of departure is R.D. Cumming's ‘comparison’ of Heidegger and Derrida which shows the latter dismantling Heidegger's conception of the truth of the artwork. Whereas Heidegger wishes to restore to the artwork its autonomy, in this way hoping to return to an original experience of Being (forgotten since the time of the Greeks), Derrida undermines his attempt by exploiting the conflict between the Heidegge‐rian metaphors of ‘ground’ and ‘groundlessness’. In this way Derrida demonstrates that, in view of the metaphorical ‘openings’ in language, attempts to return to an ‘origin’ are bound to fail. There are finally only interpretations of interpretations. Derrida's notion of metaphor in philosophical discourse (as well as de Man's related view on the subject) is pursued briefly before concluding with a discussion of his interpretation of van Gogh's peasant shoes painting as exemplification of the similarities and differences between his own and Heidegger's position regarding language, art and truth
Aesthetics · Art · Art history · Epistemology · Exemplification · Linguistics · Metaphor · Painting · Computer Science · Digital Media and Philosophy · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | Não |