In Defense of Irrationality

Richard B. Miller opens Why Study Religion? with a clear statement of purpose: “This book is about theory, method, and purpose in the study of religion, arguing for a course correction in the priorities and ideals that animate the field” (2021, ix). Miller begins his discussion with three questions that have guided the field: “Can the academic study of religion be justified? Should it be included in the curriculum? Do good reasons exist to motivate people to study religion as a profession?” (2021, 3). Miller answers yes to all three, but his book does more than provide these answers. His work is a look at the deeper problem of why scholars in religious studies cannot answer these questions directly, as well as an argument for why they should. My critique of Miller's book interrogates Miller's arguments and assumptions, specifically regarding moral reactive emotions and reason and then examines his understanding of religion itself. I argue that Miller's advocation of religion's connection to critical humanism in order to make normative evaluative statements about religion ultimately limits the range of what is religious and what is human.1 Miller's work is divided into two sections: the problem within the study of religion and the solution, which he argues rests within critical humanism. Miller first sets out the problem—the crisis of identity in religious studies—and demonstrates it through an examination of the six key methods that have contributed to, as he puts it, “a regime of truth.” Miller identifies commonalities shared by authors in the regime. First among these is the influence of pioneering religious scholar Mircea Eliade. Secondly, authors have adopted the stance of a disembodied, objective viewer, which has led to the third issue: an inability of religious scholars to engage in normative criticism. All authors, in Miller's estimation, are unable to state the goals, values, or justification for the study of religion and their proposed methodology that answers his questions. In the second section, Miller advocates that the study of religion should deeply engage with critical humanism's goals and values. He answers the opening set of questions using critical humanism, identifying four traits (post-critical reasoning, social criticism, cross-cultural fluency, and environmental responsibility) to respond to the normative questions posed in the first section of the book. Like Miller's book, my argument is divided into two parts. In the first, I will outline the regime and will address issues raised by the identity of the authors, in particular the contentious inclusion of Manual Vásquez (more on this below), and will then discuss aspects Miller sees as being common to the authors: grappling with the legacy of Mircea Eliade, the tendency to adopt a disembodied point of view, and the inability to provide a justification for religious studies. Part 2 begins with Miller's treatment of Jonathan Z. Smith's chapter on Jonestown to discuss three issues of conflict between Miller and Smith: indignation versus incomprehension, inhumanity, and irrationality. These issues affect Miller's overall understanding of religion and the normative assessment of it. I will then turn to issues raised by Miller's mistreatment of Smith in light of critical humanism and its relation to rationality and the good. Please note that this article discusses sensitive issues such as a sexual crime against a minor, in relation to Vásquez, as well as the death of children in the murder–suicide at Jonestown. Miller refers to the six paradigmatic methodologies as “the regime of truth,” using Michel Foucault's turn of phrase to refer to the implicit patterns of thinking about religion and religious scholarship that are enforced by the academy. Throughout this article, I will refer to these methods, the authors chosen to represent them, the texts under discussion, Miller's assessment of the methods, as well as my own critique of Miller's use of them. For these reasons, I will provide a brief outline of each approach within the regime. The first method Miller examines is the interpretive–comparative method epitomized by Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown by Smith. Miller describes the interpretive–comparative method as one that attempts to make sense of a piece of data (provide an interpretation) by using an analogy (compare the data to something more familiar). It is the scholar's job to understand what at first appears to be incomprehensible. Miller focuses his criticism on the last chapter in Smith's work, “The Devil in Mr. Jones,” where Smith analyzes the utopian logic of the “White Night” of the Jonestown by use of analogies to Euripides' Bacchae and Oceanic cargo cults. The second method, the scientific explanatory method, is represented by Donald Wiebe's collection of essays, The Politics of Religious Studies: The Continuing Conflict with Theology in the Academy. This method studies religious phenomenon through the principles of scientific inquiry, seeking to explain the underlying causes of religion. Miller discusses and criticizes the ideal of the detached, impartial viewer of religion, as espoused by Wiebe and his method. The theological–anthropological method is exemplified by Paul Tillich's work Systematic Theology. Unlike previous methods, the theological–anthropological posits that there are unique aspects of the human relevant to religion. The method is theological because it “views human beings as possessing an innate tendency to transcend our finite condition to makes sense of life's meaning” and anthropological because it is “premised on an account of human nature and a view of religion as a human creation” (Miller 98). Miller discusses key terms from Tillich, such as ultimate concern, while highlighting how this method adds existential and psychological depth to the study of religion. Miller turns to the sociologist of religion, Manuel A. Vásquez, to explain the materialist phenomenological method. Vásquez's influential work, More than Belief: A Materialist Theory of Religion, is used as the central text of this method. This approach is materialistic in that its focus is on the body. It is phenomenological because it considers observable practices. Vásquez's discussion advocates for a focus on embodiment and historical context. In his chapter on the genealogical–ideological method, Miller turns to three writers and one of each of their works: Russell T. McCutcheon and his work Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia; Timothy Fitzgerald and his work The Ideology of Religious Studies; and Saba Mahmood and her work Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject. This method is genealogical in that it traces the history of the values embedded in the study of religion, “seek[ing] to expose the political biases, contingent interests, and institutional allegiances embedded in the practices or in the study of religion” (Miller 148). It is ideological in that it seeks to uncover how religion (and the study of religion) has worked to naturalize, and thus conceal, certain practices and partialities. The final method Miller deals with is the philosophical-evaluative method, which is represented by two philosophers of religion: Stephen S. Bush and his work Visions of Religion: Experience, Meaning, and Power and Kevin Schilbrack and his work Philosophy and the Study of Religion: A Manifesto. This method is philosophical in that its methods are “self-reflexive, analytical, dialectical, and conceptual” (Miller 192). It is evaluative, unlike the other methods previously mentioned, in that it seeks to critically assess religious beliefs and practices, as well as scholarship on religion. Miller criticizes aspects of the regime (the detached view of the scientific approach, e.g.) while advocating for others, such as the attention to embodiment and the interrogation of presumed values within the field. Miller is also aware of the limitations in the regime, noting that it is “a largely male canon” that comes out of “a specific scholarly” demographic, noting that as a field, philosophy of religion “has failed to spark assessment and critique from a range of perspectives” (39), thereby placing the blame on the subject area itself, rather than the historical conditions that have created an overwhelmingly white, male, Western academic body in the first place. Miller provides three reasons for this narrow range of authors: each “(1) articulates a free-standing and comprehensive theory; (2) aims to guide the study of religion across a wide range of practices, contexts, and beliefs; and (3) has visibility and influence in the field” (10). While the inclusion Vásquez makes sense—he undoubtedly meets the criteria—his presence is questionable due to his criminal history. In 2016, Vásquez resigned from his position as chair at the University of Florida after pleading no contest to video voyeurism of a teenage family member. While this scandal does not impact his ability to meet Miller's criteria, it does raise many questions, questions that arise out of Miller's own In Why Study Religion? Miller one to the of moral reactive such as and in normative he does not this to his own Miller his objective reasons for Vásquez's inclusion with a disembodied a he criticizes this work, that does not address the issues that the crime the moral reactive emotions that or the historical where Miller's own criticism of the scientific explanatory of a disembodied view and ability to issues that moral with his of the of genealogical–ideological and the philosophical-evaluative methods that for religious scholars to address and normative values within the field, is at with Miller's detached in which he the use of his is what his to address this and how a book that deals with such issues as and and the of scholarship to the field, to address this and about religion first by Eliade. In such as The and the out patterns and that scholars to engage in cross-cultural about religion rather than such as and the as well as the use of such as the and and have the field. also the religious in that he that created religion in order to the at certain in This nature of with that religion has an one that cannot be by or of the other that religion on data that cannot but be and to (Miller of religion created the of an disembodied to Eliade, the of such as as well the of and within religion. of his of and as well as his to how are in and methods of religion as an and by how religion be through the of and The that religion is and is by authors, such as that religion is historical and by an account of attempts to and the Islamic Revival work the and of religion in a “the of religion in legacy of by religion and as an and unique to history and and by Miller Miller out influence by how many scholars focus on about the human of religion. While attention to the in his work, the theological–anthropological method the of human how religion existential of and methods, such as the method, attention to the of thus the disembodied nature of McCutcheon that the of this legacy is represent people in a disembodied and it all to turn into or of historical or social by Miller This with of scholars and is one of the to in the to Eliade. Miller that in the of the authors mentioned, the values, and justification for religion are largely with and of a purpose it is it is in a that is and for Smith on of Vásquez is unable to an for his while Bush the of the about values and scholarship in the field” All in Miller that the authors to a clear for religion” Miller traces the history of this by to three influential that have the of goals, all of which have worked to the ideal of the disembodied and Miller that this ideal is for the on of to the study of religion, is due to religious the arguments of Miller argues that the disembodied, view is in the and Western Miller also sees the of justification by with its of as the that human is a of these is the final which the of religious studies within the itself. Miller turns to as a to explain the of the disembodied argues that religious studies be in a in order to as a of study to from a theological the study of religion adopted this stance common to the scientific For this is a problem for two it makes it for scholars in the to provide justification for the study of religion, and it makes it for scholars to make normative statements about religion. Miller's opening set of questions the study of religion is and there are good reasons to study it. Throughout the Miller argues that religious studies a Miller's into the to provide a justification that the authors reasons for their work, reasons that Miller will The first, the interpretive–comparative method, has the of the is make sense of that is as religious (Miller The the scientific explanatory method, has the of the of religion, seeking to the human for religion or for out religious practices that understand religion's and in (Miller The third the philosophical-evaluative method, is by statement that the study of religion is the of the scholar is to explain how other human and practices, of social by Miller state that the of religious studies is to understand understand causes does it an for religious studies. the study of which to understand or which seeks to understand through and then it to religious scholars should to understand religion. the of understanding religion is to an answer to why one should study religion, and in the course of his argument it clear that his regarding justification is to normative This of appears Miller's such as he is the to a for religious of and under normative of the good Miller argues that this has because of the legacy of a scholars have religion in that are of normative interrogation and More in his chapter on Smith and the interpretive–comparative method, Miller that rather than a of that of normative he to religion good or for because it from a and it to the of and discuss normative Miller the of and his influential and argues that emotions arise not in from but also from social Miller position in the and indignation in to to or more to and that are of of good makes clear that his is on social between He such as with and and the between These are of a common in The Miller on the other are religious in it is a between an and the or the human of the the is the the is not one of in where there are of The between and the its is and is not with social The for for to his as well as the to not into the of social and of sees moral reactive such as indignation or as the for being to view the of in an and Miller is the out of which detached, impartial thinking Miller argues that scholars to engage normative criticism and moral reactive as a for thinking this Miller argues that our are that they are that our Miller that these moral reactive are are in to or from and in social for scholars in Miller's view, as by his criticism of of with her own of reasons for her reactive of as one of In a Schilbrack argues that normative values are and implicit in all scholarship thus should be Schilbrack evaluative are not of the academic study of the will not be that are not included in the field, but rather that the in religious will be While I that moral reactive emotions arise in religion and that one should these critically and Miller does not provide a of how to this in his with Smith's In Miller's own the problem of how moral emotions Miller's treatment of Smith is of his arguments moral reactive and as well as the of My will three issues that arise in Miller's of Smith's Smith's focus on rather than Smith's and the of the a utopian religious in led by the of the “White also as the Jonestown people by Smith this for because it largely by the academic while it by the religious from the and a and the as a in order these from religion” these Smith argues that to understand this and not it the of religion. Smith describes Jonestown as “the in the history of religion, for as a to it then will have our to the Smith sees the of religious studies to be one of of the of no how or something as as be to is to the an to human religion, the of the of Smith that and understand what he the of the people Smith's to understand Jonestown that his attention is on the people the on and others, rather than of the and Miller criticizes Smith's account on the of moral reactive that in it, have no sense of how the not but also and indignation among Smith's and by the that of and indignation arise to to or more to and that are of of These moral reactive emotions about the normative and of in to and which from a make about how they and other The focus on indignation to the and these people their children that Miller's focus is on the to the Miller Smith of an on of to address the and moral that is in about it It is that Smith is aware that Jonestown is that it is a scandal that the of Smith also his of assessment of Jonestown his there is one issue: to to to is not to or Smith religion as “the human of thinking through a and in the of the of the their own and the of others, Smith is to understand and rather than provide a moral of their This is relevant because Miller Smith of the aspects of the to his of Miller that Smith that that a of at Jonestown is in address the of children that people and six and children by their Miller's to have his focus on the death of the many children an to of indignation in to an of Smith's In Miller not Smith but also that to This is in Miller's of the of in Smith's Miller that Smith's account no understanding of the human by the on the and of at Miller's are in that they aspects of Smith's Smith to by the of in his For Smith begins his treatment of Jonestown with the of a two and a to people human Smith the of one of the at a on the last at and as well it the of the first of the on the their and than the of the people of as Miller of Smith the of the of the at the that “the of the of the in Jonestown be the point of Smith sees Jonestown as a of how make sense of its utopian The death of the children understand the utopian logic of where and from the to the to the to Mr. the in a final of not unlike the Oceanic cargo of in the where “a of the such as on a of the own as by their to the sense of to the of the Euripides' in to the into their is used to discuss how the their and its by Smith's to understand the that he focuses on the the of the human of Jonestown. In Miller's focus is on indignation at the death of the children of it the of the as and Smith of using (the Bacchae and the cargo of that are and thus not sense of to about the to by of and but not by of his are This of in particular Miller's about the relation of rationality to religion, and his of Smith's use of reason and utopian to the final of Miller's critical humanism. Miller's book is in He the book to and sees critical humanism as the of religious studies in that its such as reasoning, social criticism, cross-cultural fluency, and environmental and its values, such as and the of the Miller answer the normative questions he to He argues that critical humanism's values to and human as good and and and and It has Miller religion with these values by arguing that provides people with reason for and their of the and the Miller religion with reason and the of the and issues for religious the focus on reason within humanism and its of the as a for sets it from religious about the which are and on of In or the use of the and practices the and as the to about the for for the an that among the people of are to This is to be and the ability to about the and of the body. that of these makes a understanding of the more in the sense that there are no in which make the refers to these such as that or as as are “the common of religion” that “The first of religion is that religion deals with the the that cannot be This between religion and reason is not in Miller's many arguments that as a of religion. within Miller's book, a between what is and what is religious is in the of Tillich, and Smith's discussion of Jonestown between logic that scholars use and the utopian logic used by the between the rationality of and religious religious logic as one that one that while Schilbrack argues that the of religion is in that it rests is to on no by Miller that are as they arise and are to, the particular social conditions with in which human beings from and its make sense to their within their own and are thus and as they to their existential The second is with Miller's treatment of the good. Miller's of critical humanism that he focuses on the of religious Miller's of the which he from to how religious this in or as the of moral reactive emotions in social cannot be to to the is the of reason with religious reason The good of humanism does not with religious of the good as have deeply normative Miller's with moral reactive his criticism of the view espoused by the and his for normative it is that Miller sees critical humanism as an humanism argues that the particular values and of the it It does not in a detached and disembodied point of (Miller that engage the aspects of such as or while the values of social criticism and for of ideological of and Miller reasons for religion that out of his discussion of critical humanism. Religion our moral It of what is and good. of cross-cultural of and an these reasons, with the that Miller with religious studies of and the ability to environmental are in many of the other in the such as and the study of religion through critical humanism, Miller the of what as thereby to meet the of the moral and to the of The that religion is from critical humanism, the it the and the the social of are not of its but of its Smith in “The Devil in Mr. Jones,” religion has a is not Throughout Why Study Miller many writers in the regime for that he is His criticism of the genealogical–ideological method this Miller that this method reasons a critical to assess terms and that it to to Mahmood is for not using the moral reactive of while Smith is for not the emotions of and indignation that arise in his All the writers are for their disembodied and many are as not being about method and justification by Vásquez Miller to address the moral reactive emotions that arise in His justification for his chosen authors does not address this but objective reasons that not with the and ideological aspects of that critical humanism Miller the detached that he is be there are reasons to Why Study Religion? Miller does an job of how scholarship has by the work of Eliade. Miller's historical examination of these six also demonstrates the of certain and such as the examination of human in Miller's that the study of religion's problem be with critical humanism, is not one that I Miller's chapter on religious studies and the values of critical humanism begins with a section “The of Religious that the study of religion should be within critical humanism it is to be to its its of as Miller “the good the placing religion under humanism and its of the Miller the of what is out that he sees as or While not be of the values of critical humanism, it to be of religion itself. Miller's of religion, and is one that is and This view how and are and in In the to Why Study Miller that critical humanism scholars the study of religion as a to and the moral this view of religion and of limits rather than moral

Biology · Epistemology · Irrationality · Miller · Rationality · Philosophy · Religion and Society Interactions · Religious Education and Schools · Study and Philosophy of Religion

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