Rethinking Intelligence Failure
China’s Intervention in the Korean War
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20185094 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jonathan Corrado (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 36 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 199-219 |
| Publication date | 2023-01-02 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0885-0607 • E-ISSN: 1521-0561 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/08850607.2021.1938905 |
| OpenAlex | W3182098698 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
How did the U.S. Intelligence Community and policymakers fail to predict and prepare for China’s entrance into the Korean War and North Korea’s invasion? Diplomatic cables, personal accounts, and declassified national security documents reveal that warnings about possible intervention were undercut by contradicting analysis. Cognitive bias led to faulty assumptions and ambiguous conclusions. The negative effects of bias and politicization were mutually reinforcing, imperiling the efforts of actors who tried in vain to address them. Lessons gleaned from this history shed light on insights for persistent security challenges, such as the relationship between miscalculation and escalation and the difficulty of knowing one’s adversary, as well as America’s present strategic competition with China
Adversary · China · Cold war · Computer security · Intelligence analysis · National security · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Sociology · Computer Science · Intelligence, Security, War Strategy · Law · Psychology
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |