Mayor re-election and earnings management
Evidence from Portuguese municipalities
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20201366 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Augusta Ferreira (0000-0003-1659-3309, University of Aveiro, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 36 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 296-319 |
| Publication date | 2024-07-04 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Public Budgeting Accounting & Financial Management (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1096-3367 • E-ISSN: 1945-1814 |
| Publisher | Emerald (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1108/jpbafm-01-2023-0005 |
| OpenAlex | W4389451579 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 36 |
Purpose The aim of this paper is to investigate whether Mayors in Portugal engage in earnings management close to zero with the motivation of re-election. Design/methodology/approach The data used in this study were annual financial information from Portuguese municipalities from 2005 to 2016, as well as data on elections and Mayor re-elections involving three political cycles. The methodologies employed were quantitative, including graphical and panel data regressions. Findings The results indicate that municipalities used discretionary accruals to engage in earnings management to report net earnings close to zero, and re-election seems to be a motivation for earnings management behaviour. Furthermore, the results suggest that municipalities in which the Mayor is re-elected are less likely to report positive net earnings close to zero. Originality/value This paper makes a valuable contribution to the literature on earnings management in municipalities. At the theoretical level, it makes it possible to identify whether re-election is a motivation for earnings management and, in this sense, to identify patterns of behaviour by managers. On a practical level, the knowledge of a manager's behaviour patterns will help to anticipate his or her future behaviour and, consequently, may prevent inefficiencies
Accrual · Business · Earnings · Earnings Management · Econometrics · Economics · Originality · Panel data · Political science · Politics · Portuguese · Qualitative research · Social science · Sociology · Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance · Computer Science · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Accounting
Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses
The Municipal Accounting Maze
Opportunistic Political Cycles
Performance matched discretionary accrual measures
Theory of the firm
Gerenciamento de resultados e ciclo eleitoral em municípios brasileiros
Earnings management in public-sector organizations
Political competition as a motivation for earnings management close to zero
The political process and the use of debt financing by state governments
Do Top Managers’ Individual Characteristics Affect Accounting Manipulation in the Public Sector
Effective” Number of Parties
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |