A politico-economic perspective on financial sustainability
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20201616 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tilman Slembeck, Armin Jans, Thomas Leu |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 140-164 |
| Publication date | 2014-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Public Budgeting Accounting & Financial Management (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1096-3367 • E-ISSN: 1945-1814 |
| Publisher | Emerald (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1108/jpbafm-26-01-2014-b006 |
| OpenAlex | W2773071415 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 15 |
Financial sustainability requires governments to run sufficiently large primary surpluses going forward to cover the cost of servicing its debt budgets to balance in the long run. In democracies, politicians who strive for reelection often tend to systematically violate this tenet. This paper discusses two types of “anchors” that may be used to cope with this problem by limiting the room for new and excessive public debt. First, we analyze national constitutional safeguards on the basis of the “debt brake” in Switzerland and Germany. Second, we discuss international institutions to maintain financial discipline, referring to the Maastricht-criteria. These anchors are designed to allow policymakers to commit to policies that provide long term financial stability and sustainability of public finances. However, as the recent crises have shown, the problem of time inconsistency in policy making remains, especially when anchors are weak. Therefore, the paper discusses the circumstances under which institutional anchors may help to restrict politician behavior to promote sustainability of public finances. We conclude by indentifying three conditions required for the proper functioning of collective anchors in the context of public finances
Business · Commit · Debt · Economic policy · Economics · Limiting · Public economics · Sustainability · Engineering · European Monetary and Fiscal Policies · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Finance
Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance
Why countries are fiscally decentralizing
A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt
Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes
The Calculus of Consent
The domain of constitutional economics
Positive constitutional economics
Rules Rather than Discretion
A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model
Time-inconsistent Preferences and Consumer Self-Control
Ulysses Unbound
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,8 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2024 (4) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |