Deep Conceptual Moral Disagreements

Over What Do We Disagree and Why

Bibliographic Data

ID20206004
AuthorsMargit Sutrop (Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume24
Issue3
Pages295-314
Publication date2020-08-27
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTrames Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1406-0922 • E-ISSN: 1736-7514
PublisherEstonian Academy Publishers (PUBLISHER • EE)
DOI10.3176/tr.2020.3.03
OpenAlexW3081798047
LanguageEN
References cited17

We frequently find ourselves in intractable disagreements about the morality of abortion, euthanasia, restrictions to freedom, or eating meat for fun. An adequate reaction to a disagreement requires knowing which type of disagreements we are confronted with. The main aim of my paper is to explain the source of moral disagreements and clarify their nature. I will argue that some moral disagreements are deep conceptual disagreements that similarly to disagreements in logic or ontology, are not resolvable, as the resolution of the disagreement requires the disputants to adopt perspectives that are conceptually unavailable to them. I will suggest four possible sources of moral disagreements: incommensurable fundamental values, different concepts of the good life, different motivating reasons and different concepts of morality

Epistemology · Political science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Disability Education and Employment · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · Youth Substance Use and School Attendance

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