Meta-Ethical Disagreements
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20206087 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Francesco Orsi (0000-0002-4984-1033, University of Tartu, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 423-439 |
| Publication date | 2020-08-27 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Trames Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1406-0922 • E-ISSN: 1736-7514 |
| Publisher | Estonian Academy Publishers (PUBLISHER • EE) |
| DOI | 10.3176/tr.2020.3.09 |
| OpenAlex | W3081605284 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 6 |
In â Objectivity and truth: youâ d better believe itâ (1996) Ronald Dworkin attacked what he calls Archimedean scepticism about morality. His central argument, however, brings into question both such scepticism and the views which oppose it, concluding that many meta-ethical disagreements are purely verbal or, really, first-order moral ones. In this article I illustrate the scope of Dworkinâ s argument, examine (and reject) some responses to Dworkin, and finally show that many genuine meta-ethical disagreements can be rescued from Dworkinâ s argument, by being understood as neither purely verbal nor narrowly moral disagreements, but rather as normative debates about what is appropriate to do when engaged in moral argument
Engineering ethics · Political science · Engineering · Ethics in medical practice · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
|---|