Autonomy and Duties to Distant Strangers

Dados Bibliográficos

ID20206331
AutoresJukka Varelius (0000-0003-3478-9516, University of Turku, autor correspondente)
Ano2007
Volume11
Fascículo4
Páginas419-431
Data de publicação2007-10-05
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoTrames Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1406-0922 • E-ISSN: 1736-7514
EditoraEstonian Academy Publishers (PUBLISHER • EE)
DOI10.3176/tr.2007.4.06
OpenAlexW2108728125
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas12

One way of arguing for the position that states may prioritize their own citizens over foreigners draws attention to the ways in which states limit their citizens' autonomy. States routinely coerce their citizens by enforcing a large set of laws. This is incompatible with paying due respect for individual autonomy, this way of thinking proceeds, and therefore governments should compensate for the restrictions they impose on their citizens' autonomy by showing special concern for their own citizens. This line of argument for governments' prioritizing their own citizens over foreigners has faced criticism in the recent philosophical literature. Richard J. Kok-Chor Tan (1993) maintains that the kind of coercion deserving of compensation is not limited to the national context, and that even national compensation cannot ignore the moral claims of foreigners. This paper examines these criticisms by Arneson and Tan

Autonomy · Internet privacy · Political science · Sociology · Computer Science · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · Law · Political Philosophy and Ethics · War, Ethics, and Justification