Deo Parere Libertas Est

Stoic Echoes in Wittgenstein’s Conception of Destiny

Bibliographic Data

ID20249806
AuthorsBegoña Ramón Cámara (0000-0003-4591-7704, Universidad de Murcia, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume17
Issue1
Pages26
Publication date2025-12-25
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueReligions (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 2077-1444 • E-ISSN: 2077-1444
PublisherMDPI AG (PUBLISHER • IT)
DOI10.3390/rel17010026
OpenAlexW7117310590
LanguageEN
References cited23

My aim in this paper is to examine some aspects of the relationship between the concepts of God, destiny, and happiness in Wittgenstein’s writings. The analysis is done—to use an expression of the philosopher’s own—by contrast with and against the background of Roman Stoicism’s views on this matter, mainly Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius. The different uses of the concept of God that appeared in their texts are analysed, and the relationship between the notions of destiny, self-sufficiency, and happiness is clarified. Several similarities between Wittgenstein and Roman Stoics are traced, among others, those relating to the sense of the principle of distinction between what depends on oneself and what does not, the primacy of inner life as an absolute alternative to the impossible mastery of the world of facts, and the ideas of a serene acceptance of adversity and of happiness as peace of mind

Buddhism · Happiness · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications

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